T h e purpose o f th is article is to analyse th e m ore salien t featu res o f the p erfo rm an ce and evolu tion o f fo reig n cap ital in th e A rg en tin e econom y during the m ilitary g o v ern m en t w hich was in pow er from 1976 to 1983. In the intro d u ctio n, a brief sum m ary o f the lo n g -term situ ation is given, w ith em p h asis being placed on th e fundam ental role w hich foreig n capital has played in th e eco no m ic d evelop m ent of A rg en tin a throu g h ou t its history. S e ctio n O n e co ntain s a discussion o f the evolu tion o f foreign in v estm en ts authorized to estab lish them selves in th e country, special aspects o f th eir capital co n trib u tio n s and th eir d istrib u tion by sector and country o f orig in and, finally, an analysis o f tho se in v estm en ts w hich w ere ch ann elled to the financial secto r and th o se w hich orig in ated in th e U nited S tates.
T h e purpose o f th is article is to analyse th e m ore salien t featu res o f the p erfo rm an ce and evolu tion o f fo reig n cap ital in th e A rg en tin e econom y during the m ilitary g o v ern m en t w hich was in pow er from 1976 to 1983. In the intro d u ctio n, a brief sum m ary o f the lo n g -term situ ation is given, w ith em p h asis being placed on th e fundam ental role w hich foreig n capital has played in th e eco no m ic d evelop m ent of A rg en tin a throu g h ou t its history. S e ctio n O n e co ntain s a discussion o f the evolu tion o f foreign in v estm en ts authorized to estab lish them selves in th e country, special aspects o f th eir capital co n trib u tio n s and th eir d istrib u tion by sector and country o f orig in and, finally, an analysis o f tho se in v estm en ts w hich w ere ch ann elled to the financial secto r and th o se w hich orig in ated in th e U nited S tates.
In Sectio n T w o, th e in tern atio n al p resen ce in th e m anu facturing industry is discussed. T h e situ ation is analysed at tw o levels. Firstly, background in fo rm atio n is given to throw light on th e p o sitio n held by th e tran sn ation al co rp oratio n s in the stru ctu re o f industry, and secondly, their ev olu tion w ith in th e secto r during th e past decade, w hen th e A rg en tin e econom y underw ent a farreaching process o f d ein d u strialization , is discussed.
W ith regard to th e period under study, th e auth ors stress th at, alth ou gh co n sid erable incen tives w ere offered to encou rage foreig n in v estm en ts, such in v estm e n ts did not com e in o n a large scale, m ainly because o f th e recessive co nd ition s w hich prevailed fro m th e m id -1 9 7 0 s onw ards and because o f m isgivin gs about th e p o ssible d uration o f th e policy o f o p en n ess. W h e n th e o p p o rtu n ities offered by the m arket ov er the sh o rt and m edium term are lim ited,
Introduction
Since it began to take part in the international division of labour, A rgentina has been a m ajor recipient of foreign investm ent, and foreign investm ent has, in turn, played a m ajor role in building the country's structure o f production. Both when the country was mainly an exporter of agricultural products and during the period of im port substitution -either during the early stage of light industry or the later stage when the process was extended to the production of interm ediate and durable goods-foreign corporations have played a strategic role, and have acted as the moving force behind the structural changes which have taken place in the economy.
D uring the period of crop and stock production for external m arkets, foreign capital controlled the linkages which guaranteed the internal operation o f the accumulation model and the provision of foods and raw m aterials for the m etropolis (England), the country of origin o f m ost of the in v estm en ts. In v esto rs concentrated their attention on refrigeration plants, comm ercial activities pertaining to im ports and exports, the ports and, especially, the railways because of the role these activities played in the model and the potential for accumulation which they offered.
As the agroexports model began to decline -even before the definitive crisis of 1930-, there was a contraction in the flow o f new investm ents associated with that accumulation pattern. T h e few firms which did establish them selves in the country were mostly from the United States and they tended to do business in fields other than that of agricultural exports.
During the transition between periods when agricultural exports prevailed and the stage when the industrial sector became the dynamic nucleus o f capital accum ulation, foreign investm ent was oriented towards specific sectors. New investm ents were concentrated on im port-substitution manufacturing activities. At first, they were oriented towards industries which produced final goods associated with the consumption patterns of those strata of the population which, having a high average income, represented a heavy and growing demand for manufactures. T h a t was the case with many food industries -fundamentally agroindustrial ones, reflecting the transition between the two m odels-textiles, construction m aterials and som e final chem ical products and electrical consum er goods. Th ese were mainly light industries in whose developm ent foreign capital played a m ajor role, without actually d o m in a tin g or c o n tro llin g the industries concerned.
N evertheless, it was not until the late 1950s o r ea rly 1 9 6 0 s th a t th e tra n s n a tio n a l corporations began to play a hegem onic role in the substitution process, which by then had been extended to interm ediate and durable consum er goods. Industries such as the petrochem ical, autom obile, machinery and equipm ent or metal products and engineering industries were at the fore during this second stage o f the substitution process; they were set up through foreign enterprises which, soon after establishing them selves, became part of the entrepreneurial élite o f the country.
Although the total amount of investm ents approved betw een 1958 and 1962 did not represent a significant contribution to capital accumulation in industry (around 10% of capital form ation in the sector), the fact that they were concentrated in a few strategic activities (the relatively more dynamic ones, which had modern technologies, markets controlled by an oligopoly and a high accumulation potential) brought a profound transform ation o f the industrial structure and meant that the transnational corporations played a leading role in those industries which by their very nature, g iv e im p etu s to th e d e v e lo p m e n t of manufacturing in the country.
T h e new accumulation pattern of the A rgentine economy was based on the industrial sector and hence, as foreign investm ents matured, they became one of the main foundations of this accumulation. Although, in quantitative term s, foreign capital did not reach the magnitude it had at the beginning of the century (before W orld W ar I it represented 51 % of gross investm ent), it did play a fundamental role because of the degree to which it controlled the dynamic poles of capital accumulation and reproduction.
I
The transnational corporations and the opening-up policy of the last military government
Trends in direct foreign investment and investment patterns, 1976-1983
A fter the brief period of the Peronist governm ent (1 9 7 3 -1 9 7 6 ), which regulated the c e n tra l aspects o f th e m an agem en t of transnational corporations in the country, the m ilitary governm ent elim inated the main restrictions which had been placed on foreign investm ent, by establishing the new system provided for in Act 21382. T h e new authorities' aim -in which they partly succeeded-was to dism antle the classical protectionist system, to change the economic structure of the country and thus to modify the role of the various economic agents and sectors. Argentina thus embarked on a new experim ent which dramatically changed the accumulation model which had become firmly established after the Second W orld W ar. According to K osacoff (1984) , the policy put underway in April 1976 consisted, in essence, of trusting in the market mechanism s for the allocation of resources -thus making it necessary to carry out a program m e designed to liberalize the m arket-and of seeking to establish greater Table 1 A , 1977-1983 (Thousands of dollars at current prices, and percentages) S o u r c e ; P repared by th e auth ors on th e basis o f in fo rm atio n supplied by the F o reig n In v estm en t D ep a rtm en t o f th e M in istry o f E co n o m ic A ffairs.
R G E N T IN A : A U T H O R IZ E D F O R E IG N D IR E C T IN V E S T M E N T B Y FO R M O F C O N T R IB U T IO N
links with the exterior. W ith regard to the latter, tariff reform s -aimed at opening up tradeand financial reform s were im plem ented in order to rem ove restrictions on the inflow and outflow of capitals. In addition, im port duties, the exchange rate and the real interest rate were used jointly as basic tools in the struggle against inflation. This anti-inflationary objective was constantly given priority over the mediumra n g e a c c u m u la tio n p r o c e s s and th e im provem ent of incom e distribution. T h e axes of econom ic policy were the establishm ent of a m ore realistic price system (which entailed elim inating regulations, taxes, subsidies and privileges) and the consideration of com parative advantages taken in a static sense. T h ese two elem ents were the central indicators to be used in the estim ates to be made by corporations in measuring the efficiency of the investm ent process. W e have quoted from this passage at length because it provides a useful macroeconomic frame of reference for assessing the response of direct foreign investm ent to the great variety of incentives which were offered from 1976 onwards and for studying the developm ent of the foreign corporations established in the country.
As a result of the incentives received and of the consolidation of a favourable environm ent for carrying out certain highly profitable operations with a minimum am ount of risk and a rapid rate of return on capital, direct foreign investm ents authorized to set up business in the country grew steadily up to 1981, and then declined sharply in 1982 and 1983 (table 1) .
Up to 1983, authorized foreign investm ents amounted to a total of U S$ 4 772.6 m illion, i.e., at an annual rate of U S$ 681.8 m illion during the period under study (1 9 7 7 -1 9 8 5 ), or U S$ 784.2 m illion in constant 1983 dollars.
T h is influx of direct investm ents took place during two clearly differentiated subperiods. During the first, from 1977 to 1981 -coinciding with the tenure of Dr. M artínez de Hoz and the full application of the policy of opennessdirect foreign investm ent rose steadily to a level of approxim ately U S$ 1.5 billion. During the second stage (1982 and 1983) , on the other hand, investm ent fell considerably; this phenom enon was associated with a series of events, such as the departure of Dr. M artínez de Hoz, the discontinuation of the openness policy and the successive devaluations of the peso, which created an atm osphere of insecurity for foreign investors. In brief, the econom ic program m e announced in April 1976 was gradually abandoned.
As regards the form s taken by direct foreign in v estm en t, table 2 show s th at o f the investm ents authorized between March 1977 and D ecem ber 1983, a little over half (5 0 .1 % ) consisted of new capital contributions, 9 .7 % represented capitalization of external credit, 3 1 .4 % came from reinvestm ent of profits and the rem ainder (8 .8 % ) represented automatic capital contributions.
In view of the different ways in which these investm ents were made, the actual significance of the nearly U S$ 5 billion worth of foreign investm ents entering the country over a period of seven years is relative. A partial review of som e of these investm ents brings to light a series of aspects and special situations which give a much better picture of their magnitude and nature during the period considered.
New capital contributions brought in during the seven years (U S$ 2 423.8 m illion) included U S$ 7 0 2 .3 m illio n w orth o f tem porary contributions to the production of oil and natural gas and an unspecified -but significantam o u n t o f e x te r n a l re so u rce s fo r th e denationalization of com panies financed by local capital (La Isaura, Calera Avellaneda) or, in other cases, a sim ple increm ent in the share held by parent companies in the capital of local firms in which they already held the majority of stocks.1 In either of the two cases -either denationalization or increased participation in the capital of a local subsidiary-even though, formally speaking, the investm ent involved a particular type of "new capital contribution" from abroad, there was no increase in the 1977 -1981 1982 -1983 Total 1977 -1981 1982 -1983 production capacity of the country and no more than a mere transfer of ow nership of already existing capital. A sim ilar case which deserves separate treatm ent, however, because of its im plications and the magnitude o f the resources involved, is that of the purchase by Volkswagen of the assets of Chrysler Fevre A rgentina. T h is transaction actually represented an inflow of external resources which at the sam e tim e entailed a repatriation of capital by Chrysler (a United States firm ) and a displacem ent of national capital (5 1 .3 % belonged to local parts dealers and agents). N evertheless, the official statistics only show the investm ent authorized for V o lk sw a g en w e rk A .K . o f W e s t G erm an y -U S$ 102 m illion-with Chrysler Fevre A rgentina as the receiving corporation.
T h e magnitude and evaluation of the direct foreign investm ent authorized between 1977 and 1983 only serve as a partial and inadequate indicator when it comes to assessing the results obtained during the period in question; m oreover, the absence of official inform ation on the repatriation of external capital makes it im possible to quantify the net effect of the policy aimed at attracting direct foreign investm ent and thus invalidates any appraisal of its successes and failures.
Distribution o f direct foreign investment by sector and by country o f origin, 1977-1983
T h e changes in the accumulation model which were brought about as a result of certain c h a ra cte ristics o f the cou n try's econ om ic developm ent from the late 1970s onwards are reflected in the sectoral distribution of direct foreign investm ent authorized between 1977 and 1983-As during the period when agricultural exports were predom inant or during the different stages of im port substitution the orientation of foreign capital was associated with the role played by the various sectors of activity at the m acroeconom ic level and with the accumulation pattern concerned. Thus, during the period when the industrial sector was no longer the dynamic pole of capital accumulation and reproduction and that role was assumed by tertiary activities in general and by the financial sector in particular, the manufacturing industry ceased to be almost the only centre of attraction of direct foreign investm ent in the country.
T h e sectoral co m p o sitio n of foreign investm ent between 1977 and 1983 reflected a turnaround in the historical trends of the postwar period, as there was a sharp decline in direct foreign investm ent in industry which was offset by the increasing im portance of the services, com m erce and finance sectors. Th e resulting profile thus tended to be a reflection of the policy of opening up to the exterior, under which most of the goods-producing sectors were su bordinate and th e dynam ic axis was transferred to financial circuits and to service activities.
Among the investm ents authorized (not those actually made) up to Decem ber 1980 (402 proposals were approved out of a total of 508 for the period [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] , the sectoral distribution of the 166 new firms which would have been established under the 402 proposals clearly shows the sectoral preferences of the foreign investors and the im portance of non-production activities (table 3) ; only 29 would be industrial firms (1 7 .5 % of the total), i.e., the same as the number of m arketing firms and fewer than the number of firms in the services sector (34).
Complementary facts may be ascertained from an analysis of the distribution of authorized foreign investm ent by sector of destination, for which purpose the capitalization of loans and new capital contributions channelled towards new or existing firms must be considered as part of such investm ents (table 4) .
Alm ost 6 0 % of the investm ents were concentrated in only three areas, i.e., temporary investm ents in oil operations (2 4 .6 % ), the automobile industry (1 7 .4 % ) and the finance and banking sector (1 6 .6 % ). If investm ents in oil, are left out, the automobile industry becomes the main receiving sector (U S$ 495.4 m illion). O f investm ents authorized for the sector, 3 3 .7 % (U S$ 167 m illion) were for "capitalization of loans", in most cases, these were used to improve the structure and the, econom ic and financial situation of the receiving firm s, which had been seriously affected by the setback suffered by the sector as a whole. New capital contributions (U S$ 328.4 m illion) were accounted for by the entry of a new international firm (Volkswagen) and the investm ent plans of Ford (a new truck plant) and Fiat. W ith in the context of a farre a c h in g s e c to r a l r e o r g a n iz a tio n , th e se investm ents were offset by the closing down and the consequent repatriation of capital (in the first three cases) of General M otors (1 9 7 8 ), Citroen (1 9 7 9 ) and Chrysler (purchased by Volksw agen), Industrias Mecánicas del Estado (1 9 8 0 ) and the m erger of SA F R A R and Fiat (Sevel).
T h e greatest net inflow of external capital took place in the financial sector and, more specifically, the banking sector. Authorized investm ents amounted to U S$ 4 7 3 .6 m illion, thanks to the entry of fifteen new foreign banks, which is evidence of the growing interest of international financial groups in setting up operations in the country.
On the other hand, the relative lack of interest shown by foreign investors in putting their capita] into the manufacturing sector one of the most affected by the policy of openness, may be seen in the figures showing the number of industrial firms established up to D ecem ber 1980. Table 4 shows that -despite the influence of the automobile sector-the various branches of industry as a whole represent slightly less than half the authorized investm ents (4 8 .3 % ); during any other subperiod of the last three decades, industry had always accounted for over 9 0 % to 9 5 % of all direct foreign investm ent established in the country. T h ere is no question that the m anufacturing industry ceased to be the predom inant sector as far as the attraction of foreign capital is concerned. Contrary to what happened in the case of changes in the sectoral com position of foreign investm ents the distribution by country of origin of these investm ents did not vary greatly with respect to the legislative trends o f the last few decades. As regards the high concentration in a few countries and the relative share represented by each of them , the structure did not differ substantially from that of any other postwar period, nor -except in the contrasting cases of the United Kingdom and Italy-was there much variation with regard to the stock of foreign capital accumulated in the country around the m id-1970s (table 5). (W est Germ any, N etherlands, Switzerland and Spain) are included, the figure increases to 9 0 % . O f the rem aining countries of origin, the only ones worth m entioning would be the negligible presence of Japan (1 .4 % ) and the United Kingdom which, with only 0 ,7 % of the total, ranks thirteenth in the listing of countries of origin of investm ents.
Direct foreign investment in the financial sector o f Argentina
T h e substantial amount of direct foreign investm ent that was placed in the financial sector may be explained, to a large degree, by the fact that the high degree of liquidity of the financial market coincided with the search for new in v estm en t o p p o rtu n ities and the application, at the local level, of a policy of openness, which involved an effort to attract the attention of the world banks. T h e financial re fo rm s o f m Íd -1 9 7 7 , th e w id esp read liberalization of the capital m arket, the exchange lag policy and its effect on the spread between domestic and external interest rates were some of the main factors which created favourable conditions for arousing the interest of the foreign banks. These local phenom ena occurred simultaneously with the high liquidity of the international market and the intensification of oligopolistic com petition among the world banks, essentially as a result of their growing transnationalization.
As a result of this com bination of circumstances, there was a considerable influx of foreign capital to the financial sector of Argentina, especially to the banks. H ence, direct foreign investm ent in the sector had the greatest economic impact during the period, because of its effect on the shaping of the financial market. Around 1983, total authorized investm ents in the sector amounted to U S$ 473-6 m illion, as a result of the approval of fifteen investm ent proposals which, in every case, had to do with the establishm ent of new banks in the country. T h is influx had two interesting features, i.e., its distribution over tim e and the form s of establishm ent involved. T h e investm ents were highly concentrated in tim e; thus, slightly over 9 5 % were authorized w ithin a three-year period -between late 1978 and late 1981-and the fifteen banks were actually established in 1979 and 1980 (table 6) .
T h e concentration of these investm ents in tim e had to do with the fact that around the end of 1978, the openness policy took a new turn; thus, with a "m onetary approach to the balance of paym ents", the financial m arket was opened up com pletely, thanks to the elim ination of barriers to international capital flows. In addition, an exchange lag policy was applied w hich provided o p p o rtu n ities for highly p ro fita b le in v estm en t, essen tially in the financial circuits. T h e combined effect o f the new legislation on foreign investm ent, the financial reform of 1977 and the liberalization of the capital m arket was to arouse increasing interest among the international banks in establishing them selves in the country.
As regards the way in which the new banks set up their operations in the country, in only three of the fifteen cases did they purchase local banks, i.e., Irving Tru st purchased Banco Table 6 A T h is method of penetration, which was different even from that used by the foreign banks towards the late 1960s, had to do with the type o f business carried out by the new banks (fo reig n tran saction s and n o n -trad itio n al services for a small core of users), which was different from the type of activities carried out by most of the local banks (receiving deposits and granting loans).
Although the number of firm s almost doubled, the influence of the foreign banks on the local m arket showed hardly any variation between 1976 and 1983 (table 7).
In late 1976, when the neom onetarist goals of the economic authorities had become clearly evident, the foreign banks had recovered part of the share in total deposits on the com m ercial circuit which they had lost during the Peronist governm ent. Thus, while in 1974 they received 15% of the total, by the end of 1976 they controlled 16.5% .
Towards the end of 1978, as a result of the restrictions imposed by the Central Bank on the opening up of new subsidiaries, the foreign banks' share fell back to the levels of the early 1960s. Suffice it to say that, while between 1970 and 1977, the foreign banks reduced the number of their branch offices from 223 to 219, the banking system as a whole increased them from 2 298 to 3 152 (table 8) .
T h is loss of the foreign banks' share in total deposits received and the decline in the number of branch offices had to do with the type of business in which they engaged, inasmuch as they chose to com pete in the area of interest rates while at the same tim e, as a result of the institutional reclassification brought about by the reform s and the different style of com petition prevailing, in which there seemed to be a ranking of the banks' spatial capacity to attract deposits, there was a substantial increase in the total number of com m ercial banks and their branch offices (Feldm an and Som m er, 1984) .
At any rate, with the new influx of direct foreign investm ent in the banking sector Table 7 A
R G E N TIN A : IN D IC A T O R S OF P A R T IC IP A T IO N O F FO REIG N BA N K S IN TH E PESO D E P O SIT S M A R K ET
{Number of entities, and percentages) Indicator 1974 Indicator 1976 Indicator 1978 Indicator 1980 Indicator 1981 Indicator 1982 Indicator 1983 Number Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina, Table 8 A towards the end of 1980, the transnational banks recovered a good deal of the ground they had lost betw een 1971 and 1978. From a 1 3 .3 % share of all deposits in the hands of com m ercial banks, in 1978 they managed to attract 17% . It was not until 1981 that the foreign banks also began to apply a policy of opening up branch o ffic e s as a way o f im p ro v in g th e ir com petitiveness; in just one year, the number of branch offices rose from 241 to 373. T o a large extent, this proliferation o f branch offices seems to have been a residual effect of the succession of bankruptcies and interventions of national private firm s which began with the closing down of the Banco de Intercam bio Regional in March 1980. Several o f the foreign banks belonging to the "retail and diversified" sector purchased som e o f the branch offices of liquidated institutions from the C entral Bank.
R G E N T IN A : EV O LU TIO N OF Q U A N T IT Y OF BA N K BRAN CH O FFIC ES BY SOURCE OF C A PITA L (Absolute figures and percentages)
T h e results of 1982 also reflect, to a large extent, the impact of the A rgentine-British dispute over ow nership of the Falkland Islands (Islas M alvinas) and the Georgia and Southern Sandwich Islands. Part o f the deposits sought refuge in State entities and part of the deposits in foreign banks were channelled to firm s that were less vulnerable, in the users' view, to the hazards of the armed conflict. Betw een 1981 and 1982, the transnational institutions' share in total resources handled by com m ercial banks fell from 17 .0 % to 14.2% . In 1983 -when expectations centred on the restoration of the country's institutional stability-, there was a slight im provem ent in the level of deposits accumulated by the foreign banks. As regards the total amount in the hands of com m ercial banks, their share rose from 1 4 .2 % to 1 6 .8 % , two points below the record set in 1969.
In addition to discussing the p osition of th e tra n sn a tio n a l banks in the local m arket (e ith e r in peso deposits or in num ber o f bank o ffice s), it is w orthw hile analysing the ways in w hich th eir in flu en ce was exercised w ith in the banks them selv es. T o this end, table 9 shows the sh are o f the m ajor firm s in total deposits received by the tra n sn a tio n a l banks up to D ecem ber 1983 -w ith the corresponding figures for Ju n e 1 9 7 6 -as well as their distribution according to country of origin of the capital, with the banks which started during the recent m ilitary régim e shown separately.
Som e of the salient features of the transnational presence in banking activities are the following: a) T h e high degree of concentration of deposits in a small group of banks. One third of the banks (11) attracted a little over 8 0 % of all deposits and four of them accounted for almost half (4 9 .3 % ) of the total. b) N one of the eleven firms entered the country during the recent m ilitary régime. T h at g ro u p in clu d es tw o b an k s th a t w ere denationalized during the period in question, i.e., Tornquist (purchased by Crédit Lyonnais) and, indirectly, Internacional, absorbed by the Bank of America, which had already been doing business in the country. c) T h e absence of m ajor changes, with respect to 1976, in the com position of the leader group or, at least, its size, which -one might assume-would entail almost doubling the number of firm s set up by foreign capital.
d) T h e average represented by the United States banks, both as regards the number of firm s ( I I ) and as regards their share in total deposits channelled to the foreign banks (5 1 .2 % ); hence, 4 5 .4 % of the total is concentrated in only four banks. e) Finally, the clear difference between banks which entered the country before the recent m ilitary régime and those which entered during that period, as regards their ranking in the peso deposit market. W hile the form er accounted for 8 2 .9 % of those deposits, the latter only accounted for the rem aining 1 7 .1% , if the analysis is confined to the new banks established during those years, the figure falls to 9 .6 % . This uneven participation once again shows up the different characteristics of the two groups, i.e., the form er were predom inantly "retailers" and "diversified", while the ones begun under the policy o f gen erally open m arkets w ere predom inently "w holesalers" and "specialized".
United States investments in Argentina
T h e direct foreign investm ents which entered the country during the recent military régime may also be analysed in the light of the official statistics of the countries of origin of those capitals. It is thus possible to com pare the rate at Table 9 A
R G E N T IN A : SH ARE OF EACH OF TH E V A RIO U S FO REIG N B A N K S IN T O T A L PESO D E P O SIT S IN T H E IR H ANDS
(Percentages) which capital was channelled to A rgentina with its evolution at the global level, sectoral profile, profitability and the specific application o f the benefits obtained from those investm ents (reinvestm ent or repatriation). W ith this inform ation, a clear picture em erges of the place which A rgentina occupies among all countries receiving foreign investm ents.2 T h e first aspect to be studied is that of the changes that have occurred in respect o f the stock of U nited States capital established in A rgentina. Betw een 1976 and 1983, direct foreign investm ents of U nited States capital in A rgentina rose from U S$ 1 366 m illion to U S$ 3 054 m illion; this represents an average annual grow th of 12 .2 % (4 .4 % per year in constant 1976 dollars). D uring the sam e period, total U n ited S ta tes in v estm en ts abroad, measured in constant values, declined slightly (table 10) .
Som e com m ents are in order in connection with this sharply contrasting perform ance. Betw een 1976 and 1979, A rgentina followed the trend noted at the international level, i.e., the export of United States capital continued to slow down, a phenom enon which had begun with the recession of [1974] [1975] . T h e dramatic increase in United States investm ents accumulated abroad betw een the end of W orld W ar II and the early 1970s was a result of the dynamic evolution of the world economy and the steady expansion of production capacity at the international level. T h at grow th was interrupted during the crisis of [1974] [1975] , which seriously affected capital flow s, especially th o se directed towards production.
T h is behaviour fits into the overall picture of the evolution and cycles of the international economy. W ithin this framework, the rate of grow th of United States investm ents in A rgentina between 1976 and 1979 (1 .7 % per year) was quite sim ilar to the rate recorded at the international level.
1 A n an aly sis o f th e in fo r m a tio n s u p p lie d by th e U n ite d S tates D e p a r tm e n t o f C o m m e rc e w ill sh o w th e d e stin a tio n , at th e in te rn a tio n a l a n d local levels, o f m o st c a p ita ls e sta b lish e d o u tsid e th e ir c o u n trie s o f o rig in . T h e sta tistic s p u b lish e d by th e D e p a r tm e n t in its Survey of Current Business m ak e it p o ssib le to study th e e v o lu tio n a n d th e m a in c h arac te ristic s o f d ire c t fo reig n in v e s tm e n ts in each re c eiv in g co u n try a n d h e n ce to study th o se d ire c te d to A rg e n tin a in th e last few years.
T h is had not been the case during the preceding years. As a result of the recessive en v iron m en t p revailin g in the world econom y, the general in stability o f exchange rates and of financial and m onetary m arkets and the absence o f a recovery o f satisfactory rates of return on in v estm en ts abroad (w hich fell steadily betw een 1979 and 1 9 8 3 ), on the one hand, and, on the o th er, o f the dom estic p o lic ie s fo llo w e d by th e R e p u b lic a n A d m in istration , th ere was a steady decline, in real term s, o f d ire c tU n ite d S ta te s in v estm en ts abroad (th e cum ulative rate was -1 .6 % per year between 1979 and 1983). On the other hand, United States investm ents in Argentina during the sam e period showed a real cumulative grow th of 6 .4 % per year. T his perform ance reflects the interest of United States investors in establishing their capitals in the country. An analysis of the sectoral content of this growth shows that it was spearheaded by two activities, i.e., oil and finance. W hereas in global term s, cumulative direct foreign investm ent increased 2.2 times between 1976 and 1983, investm ents T a b le 10 , 1976-1983 (Millions of 1976 dollarsa, and percentages)
A R G EN TIN A : EVO LU TIO N O F U N IT ED ST A T E S IN V E ST M E N T IN A RG EN TIN A A N D TH RO U G H O U T TH E W O RLD
In v e s tm e n t in A rg e n tin a Table 11 A , 1976-1983 (Millions of dollars at current prices) Sector 1976 Sector 1977 Sector 1978 Sector 1979 Sector 1980 Sector 1981 Sector 1982 Sector 1983 M in oil rose more than 4.5 tim es and investm ents in financial activities grew more than fourfold. O n th e o t h e r h a n d , in v e s t m e n t s in m anufacturing industry, which historically had been preferred by United States investors, did not double, in current values, during those seven years, in constant' values, the cumulative annual rate o f grow th fell to 0 .7 % (table 11) . As a result of this d ifferen ce in grow th rates, the sectoral structure of direct U nited States in v estm en ts in A rgen tin a changed su bstantially. O ver a period o f only seven years, the p etroleu m sector m ore than doubled its sh are o f the total -1 2 .7 % in 1976 and 2 6 .5 % in 1 9 8 3 -and the share of the financial interm ediation sector rose from 5 .3 % to 9 .8 % . As a result of the channelling of capital towards banking activities between 1979 and 1981, seven of the fifteen banks entering the country were of U nited States origin.
R G E N T IN A : A CCRU ED U N IT E D ST A TES D IR E C T IN V E ST M E N T , B Y SEC TO RS O F A C T IV IT Y
In both cases, the growing participation of United States investm ents reflected the trends occurring at the international level, where, during the same period -1976 to 1983-, the share of the petroleum sector rose from 2 0 .8 % to 2 7 .0 % of cum ulative U n ited States investm ents abroad and that of the financial sector rose from 12.3% to 1 2 .7 % ; investm ents in manufacturing, on the other hand, fell from 4 4 .8 % to 3 9 .9 % (United States D epartm ent of Commerce, several years).
It would appear that the nature of the process whereby the A rgentine economy was opened up and, in that context, the economic activities which appealed m ost to foreign investors, were completely in line with the trends as regards sectoral distribution which prevailed in the export of United States capital, i.e., petroleum exploration and production and transnationalization of banks. This grow th was offset by a decline in the manufacturing industry which, over the seven-year period, fell by more than 11 points in its ranking within the scheme of total direct foreign investm ents from the United States accumulated in A rgentina. T h e relative lack of interest in investing in one of the activities most seriously affected by the military governm ent's econom ic policy appears to have been a constant phenom enon throughout this period and it affected alm ost every sector of industry.
As regards the subsidiaries operating in A rg en tin a , the census of direct foreign investm ents carried out by the United States Com m erce D epartm ent in the late 1970s shows that in 1977, there were 279 subsidiaries of U nited States firm s in A rgentina; their total assets were equivalent to U S$ 3 966 million, they employed 113 389 persons and their annual sales amounted to U S$ 3 615 million.
A l t h o u g h s e v e r a l i n t e r m e d i a t e com binations were possible, two extrem e situations prevailed as regards the operation of tra n sn a tio n a l co rp o ra tio n s estab lish ed in relatively less developed countries, i.e., some produced for the dom estic m arket and some were oriented towards the m arket of their country of origin or the world m arket in general, in the context eith er of the internationalization of production processes or of the supply of goods, essentially primary ones, at a lower relativ e cost. T ab le 12 show s the high proportion of total sales accounted for by the local market (8 4 .6 % ), which was a result of their having been established under the im portsubstitution model. Exports were almost marginal with respect to production for the domestic market.
T h e low coefficient of local exports (1 5 .4 % ) with respect to the world rate (3 8 .1 % ) leads to the conclusion that most of the United States transnationals operating in Argentina were organized in term s of local demand and that, in general, exports represented surplus production beyond the levels of local demand (U.S. D epartm ent of Comm erce, 1981).
T h e captive trade of U n ited S tates tr a n s n a tio n a l c o r p o r a tio n s o p e ra tin g in Argentina was negligible. W hereas at the international level, 33.1% of the sales of the United States subsidiaries was accounted for by intrafirm trade, in A rgentina, that trade amounted to no m ore than 9 .3 % and, as might be expected, it was only significant in the case of the small volume of exports to the United States, where it represented 8 7 .5 % of the total. Table 12 A T h e United States firm s did not play a m ajor role in creating em ploym ent in the country. In 1977, they employed a total of 113 389 persons (table 13), i.e., 2 .2 % of total urban em ploym ent in the country (excluding the agricultural sector). As regards the sectoral com position of the jobs concerned, the manufacturing industry accounted for a high share, as it absorbed a little over 8 0 % of all workers employed by the United States transnational corporations. Almost half those jobs were concentrated in two industries, i.e., tra n sp o rt eq u ip m en t (basically, the autom obile industry, which, at the census date, included three United States firm s) and chemical and petrochem ical products. Even though these are capital-intensive industries, between the two they generated m ore than 44 300 jobs in 1977.
R G E N T IN A : SA LES O F U N IT E D ST A T E S FIR M S, B Y GEO GRAPH ICAL D E S T IN A T IO N A N D LIN K A G E W ITH TH E PU RCH
As regards the sectoral cost of labour, statistics compiled by the United States D epartm ent of Com m erce show a wide scattering of wages am ong the different sectors in which the transnationals operated. Apart from the differences that can be attributed to a difference in the average skills o f personnel employed, the magnitude of wage variations among sectors would appear to have been due to factors associated with the circumstances prevailing at the national level during the year when the Com m erce D epartm ent census was taken. In 1977, the second year of the military régime, there were already clear signs of many of the effects of the economic policy applied after March 1976, which were later accentuated. Although the widespread contraction of real incom e of the wage-earning sector appears to have been one of the fundamental results of that policy, its impact differed depending on the econ om ic sector concerned. Jo b s in the manufacturing industry were the most seriously affected by the policy of "social discipline", inasmuch as in 1977, real wages in that sector were equivalent to only 6 6 .3 % of the real wages for 1975. T h e contraction was not so sharp in m ost of the other econom ic sectors. This uneven evolution partly explains the structure of average costs of labour employed by United States subsidiaries operating in Argentina.
In addition, around 1977, the sharp drop in wages which had occurred during the early years of the econom ic openness policy had a strong impact on the relation between average wage< costs in the country and those prevailing in other regions where subsidiaries of United States firm s operated. Indeed, in 1977 (table 14) , the average annual cost per person employed by U n ited S ta tes su bsid iaries o p e ratin g in A rgentina was lower than it was in any other grouping to which A rgentina belonged (Latin Am erica and the underdeveloped nations) and, of course, it was lower than the cost paid by those sam e subsidiaries in the developed countries. As a m atter of fact, if the com parison is confined to the manufacturing industry, in which the country has a higher degree of industrialization and developm ent than the rest of Latin America Table 14 A or the underdeveloped countries as a whole, wage costs prove to be higher than the average in the underdeveloped countries as a whole but lower by almost 10% than the cost at the Latin Am erican level. These results appear to tarnish the traditional international image of Argentina and, specifically, to detract from its position among the relatively less developed countries, whether these be defined as countries having an interm ediate degree of industrialization or sem i industrialized countries, or as the countries of the underdeveloped world in general. According to some indicators, Argentina may be compared to developed societies; according to others -the m ajority-, it may be compared to backward economies. However, very few of the latter com parisons are based on wage costs. If the A rgentine economy has in any way been d ifferen t from m ost o f the underdeveloped world, that has been the case precisely in the area of wage costs, which could hardly be considered one of the country's com parative advantages at the international level.
Although it is impossible to establish a direct correspondence between wage costs and the rate of profitability of United States investm ents on the basis of the inform ation available, there is no question that the year 1976 marks a breaking point in the prevailing medium-and long-term trends as regards the profit m argins of direct United States investm ents in the country. At the beginning of the 1970s, that rate never amounted to more than 6 .5 % of cumulative investm ent and, if one takes the analysis back to I9 6 0 , the margin was never higher than 15% per year. Between 1976 and 1980, however, this percentage was surpassed during four of the five years and, during two of those years (1 9 7 9 and 1980), profitability rose to more than 3 0 % per year.3 By com parison with the levels recorded at 'T h e s h a r p lag in th e e x c h a n g e p a rity d u rin g th o se years g e n e ra te d a doubly p o sitiv e e ffe c t o n th e p ro fita b ility in d o lla rs o f tra n s n a tio n a l c o rp o ra tio n s . O n th e o n e h a n d , as a re su lt o f th e m a la d ju stm e n t o f e x c h a n g e p a rity , th e b e n e fits o b ta in e d in local c u rren cy w e re increased, in real te rm s, at th e w o rld e co n o m y level, w h e n e x p re ss e d o r c o n v e rte d in to d o lla rs o r any o th e r fo reig n currency. O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e tag in th e e x c h a n g e p a rity a nd th e fact th a t th e d o lla r w as th e only m e rc h a n d ise w h o se fu tu re p ric e w as k n o w n m ad e it p o ssib le to a p ply h ighly p ro fita b le m e c h an ism s in th e local financial circu its to in crease th e d isp a rity o f in te re s t rates w ith re sp e c t to th o se p re v a ilin g o n th e in te rn a tio n a l m ark ets. Reinvested profits in relation to total profits. the international level during those same four years, the profit margin for operations in the country was more than 3 0 % higher than at the world level (table 15) . D e s p it e t h e s e d i f f e r e n t le v e ls o f p ro fita b ility , the rein v estm e n t rate for A rgentina was lower than for the world as a whole during five of the eight years under study. In other words, despite the higher profit margins and the encouragem ent given to reinvestm ent within a fram ework of increasing perm issiveness, the United States subsidiaries established in the country were, by com parison with those in the rest of the world, relatively more disposed towards rem itting their profits to their parent com panies, i.e., they tended to prefer rapid recovery of their investm ent over the incentives offered. It is not surprising, therefore, that at the end of eight years, the influx of direct investm ent from the United States to Argentina was much lower than the outflow of profit rem ittances and, on a lesser scale, the repatriation of capitals to the United States, Even without looking at other possible channels of transfer -royalties, administrative prices of captive trade-the net flow of capital to the United States arising from direct investm ents in Argentina amounted to U S$ 781 million; in 1983 values, this represents an average annual flow of more than U S$ 100 million (table 16) . Table 16 A , 1976-1983 
R G E N T IN A : C A PIT A L FLOW S A SSO C IA TED W ITH U N IT ED ST A TES D IR E C T IN V E ST M E N T

II The transnational corporations and the Argentine manufacturing industry
T h e participation of transnational corporations in the m anufacturing industry was studied at two distinct but com plem entary levels. Firstly, its structure w ithin the sector was identified; because the census inform ation used refers only to one year, the picture that em erges is a static but com plete one. Secondly, the trend in respect of the transnational presence during the past decade was studied, by com p arin g the perform ance of transnational corporations and that of sim ilar national-capital corporations (table 17).
Economic impact and main characteristics a) Participation o f transnational corporations in industrial production
One of the main indicators of the magnitude of transnational participation in industry is the contribution of these firm s to overall production in the sector (table 18) . Firm s with foreigncapital participation controlled 3 0 .8 % of all industrial production reflected in the most recent econom ic census carried out in the country (1974) .
T h is p a rticip a tio n varied considerably am ong the different divisions of industry; it was relatively greater in those sectors which, because of their dynamism, rate of adoption of new technology and dynamic effect tended to be at the head of the entire industrialization process. T h e only sectors in which the transnational corporations played only a m inor role were those which played a m arginal role in the industrial profile of the country and which historically had the lowest grow th rate. T h e difference in the participation of foreign-capital firm s in the various sectors of industry were closely related to their growth rate and the degree to which they adopted new technology.
As regards the link between the degree of oligopolization of the different branches of industry (five-digit classifications, ISIC , R ev .2) and the extent of the transnational presence in them, table 18 shows that most of the production of foreign-capital enterprises was generated in highly concentrated b ranch es4 (oligopolized) and that it tended to decrease as the com petitiveness of the various strata of 
Table 17 A R G E N T IN A : SHARE OF T R A N SN A T IO N A L C O R PO R A TIO N S IN IN D U ST R IA L P R O D U C T IO N , B Y SEC TO RS OF A C T IV IT Y , 1973
(Millions of 1973 pesos, and percentages)
Value of production w . , . S o u r c e ; P repared by the auth ors on th e basis o f data from the N ation al In stitu te o f S ta tistics and C ensuses (In stitu to N acio n al de E stad ística y C ensos -ÎN E C ) (1 9 7 4 ). concentration increased. Thus, whereas 6 2 .1 % of the production of transnational corporations was accounted for by highly concentrated branches, only 14 .1 % was generated in lowconcentration markets. In addition, the share of transnational corporations in industrial production declined as the concentration of the m arkets declined. W hereas the participation of transnationals in the m anufacturing industry as a whole was slightly over 3 0 % , their production in the highly concentrated branches was 4 7 .9 % and in com petitive m arkets it was barely over 15% .
T h e transnational presence in the Argentine industry was characterized by a preference, on the part of the transnational corporations, for highly concentrated m arkets, and it was in these that they placed a large share of their overall production -the largest share, in the case of highly concentrated branches having few establishm ents.
As regards their sectoral distribution, table 19 shows that the preference of foreigncapital firms for the more highly concentrated markets is to be seen in alm ost all industrial a c tiv itie s . In a lm o st ev ery ca se, th e transnationals' share in the production of the highly concentrated strata was higher than their share in sectoral totals, and it declined as the com petitiveness of the different strata increased. Table 20 shows the distribution and participation of transnational corporations in industrial production by type of goods, according to their functional destination and the type of market in which production was generated.
In the first place, the table shows that tran sn ation al corporation s were dissem inated throughout the industrial spectrum . It was only in the area of non-durable consum er goods, which may be associated with relatively l e s s c o m p l e x t e c h n o l o g y , t h a t t h e tran sn atio n als' con tribution (2 2 .6 % ) was low er than its share in industry as a whole. On the oth er hand, th eir highest level of p articip ation was in the area of durable consum er goods ( 5 9 .2 % ) ; it should be noted Table 18 A 
R G E N T IN A : P A R T IC IP A T IO N OF T R A N SN A T IO N A L C O RPO RA TIO N S IN IN D U ST R IA L P R O D U C T IO N , B Y C O N C EN TR A TIO N ST R A T A , 1973
(Number of branches, millions of 1973 pesos, and percentages)
S o u r c e : Based on K h av isse and A zpiazu (1 9 8 3 ).°H C B (F ): h ig h -co n cen t rat ion branches w ith few estab lish m en ts; H C B (M )
: h ig h -co n cen tratio n branches w ith many e sta b lish m en ts; M C B : m ed iu m -con cen tration branch es; LCB: low -con cen tration branches. Table 19 A S o u r c e : Based on K h a v isse and A zpiazu (1 9 8 3 ); IN E C (1 9 7 4 ). a H C B : h ig h -co n cen t rat ion bran ch es; M C B : m ed iu m -cu n centration branch es; LCB: low -con cen tration branches.
R G E N T IN A : P A R T IC IP A T IO N O F T R A N SN A T IO N A L C O R PO R
t h a t a la r g e g ro u p o f t r a n s n a t io n a l co rp o ratio n s con tributed to the d evelopm ent o f this industry during the second stage of the su bstitu tion process. As regards capital goods -w hich play only a m inor role, both globally and w ithin the production o f the tran sn ation al co rp o ra tio n s-they were concentrated in a sm a ll n u cleu s o f in d u s trie s (tr a c to r s , c o m m u n ic a tio n s e q u ip m e n t , e l e c t r ic a l conductors) which, in m ost cases, were com parable to durable consum er goods, both because of their relatively recent developm ent in the country and because of the possibilities of scale offered by the size of the m arket and the introduction of new technologies. On the other hand, the transnational presence was negligible in a wide variety of industries producing capital goods. T h e share of the transnationals in the production of capital goods (3 1 .9 % ) was not very different from their share in total production of the manufacturing industry. One elem ent which the four categories of goods had in com m on was the association betw een the m agnitude o f tran sn atio n al participation and the level of oligopolization of the markets. Regardless of the type of goods concerned, the foreign-capital corporations always had a greater share in the highly concentrated markets and that participation tended to decline in direct proportion to the decline in the degree of oligopolization of the rem aining strata.
b) Plant size and degree o f control o f foreign capital
T ab le 21 shows the distribution, by strata of concentration, of the transnational corporations and o f their establishm ents em ploying less than and m ore than 100 workers. It also shows their r e l a t i v e c o n t r ib u t io n to t r a n s n a t i o n a l p ro d u c tio n and th e ir ra n k in g in th e m anufacturing industry as a whole.
O f the total number of establishm ents (824) belonging to foreign-capital firm s (7 2 4), almost 6 0 % employed more than 100 persons at the tim e of the census. T h e prevalence of larger plants tended to increase in direct proportion to the degree o f concentration o f the markets concerned. Establishm ents em ploying more than 100 persons in the highly concentrated b r a n c h e s h a v i n g fe w e s t a b l i s h m e n t s represented 7 3-3% o f the total, whereas in the co m p etitiv e bran ch es o f industry, they represented less than half (4 9 .0 % ). These disparities show that, in general, and even without taking into account potential production capacity, plant size requirements for operating in the m ore concentrated markets were not s i m i l a r , e v e n c o n s i d e r i n g o n ly t h e transnationals, to the requirem ents for markets that were not very concentrated. Thus, there appears to be a relationship between the transnational presence in industry and the form ation o f oligopolistic market structures and between the latter and the relative size of manufacturing establishm ents.
T h e predom inance of larger plants is even m ore pronounced in respect of the contribution o f fo r e ig n -c a p ita l e n te r p r is e s to to ta l production, which is also higher in the more concentrated strata. A t the global level, establishm ents em ploying m ore than 100 persons generated 93-4% of transnational production, and the percentage rose to 9 7 .9 % in the highly concentrated branches of industry with few establishm ents, while it fell to 8 4 .3 % in the less concentrated industries. S o u r c e : P repared on th e basis o f K h av isse and Azpiazu (1 9 8 3 ); IN E C (1 9 7 4 ). " H C B (F ): h ig h -co n cen tratio n branch es w ith few estab lish m en ts; H C B (M ): hig h -co n cen tratio n branches w ith many e sta b lish m en ts; M C B : m ed iu m -con cen tration bran ch es; LCB: iow -con cen tration branches. bIncluding bran ch es 3 8 4 3 4 "R e c tific a tio n of m o to r" and 3 9 0 9 9 "M iscellan eou s m anu facturing ind ustries". Table 21 A Because estab lish m en ts o f tran sn ation al c o r p o r a tio n s r e p re se n te d only a sm all p ercen tage of the total for industry as a w hole -0 .7 % , it is advisable to find out why the two totals w ere so d ifferen t. T h e units of production covered by the census included a large num ber o f crafts or sem i-craft activities a n d s m a l l s h o p s -8 5 . 6 % o f t h e estab lish m en ts counted em ployed less than 10 p erso n s-in which the transnational presence was virtually nil. T h is had a decisive effect on the com parison between the two totals, while the heterogeneity which was characteristic of the industrial sector and the national-capital firms as a whole was not evident in the case of transnational industry. T h is explains the very m inor role played by transnational firm s whose plants employed less than 100 persons (0 .3 % ). On the other hand, transnationals controlled m ore than one fifth of all establishm ents (2 2 .5 % ) com prising the subgroup of plants which employed more than 100 persons.
R G E N T IN A : E STA BLISH M EN TS U N D ER TH E C O N TR O L OF T R A N SN A T IO N A L C O R P O R A TIO N S, B Y C O N C EN TR A T IO N ST R A T A , A N D TH EIR P A R T IC IP A T IO N IN TH E T O TA
Regardless of the size of the plant considered, the extent of the transnational presence was clearly related to the level of oligopolization. T h e percentage of plants belonging to transnational corporations tended to increase in direct proportion to the degree of concentration of the different strata.
T h e fact that the transnational presence was greater in the larger plants and that their contribution increased in proportion to the level of oligopolization of m arkets was also reflected in the value of manufacturing production. All industrial firms which used foreign capital were considered on the same term s, i.e., without any distinction being made with regard to the level of foreign-capital participation or the degree of control such participation entailed. T h e study represents a preliminary analytical estim ate which does not disregard the fact that foreign capital did not always hold m ajority ownership of local firms nor did it always exercise actual control over management. On the other hand, it does not take into account criteria which might be adopted to identify a local firm as a subsidiary of a transnational corporation.
In order to determ ine the type of ownership structure which characterized the presence of transnational capital in industry, three different groups o f firms were listed, on the basis of w hether foreign capital participation was above 50.1 % , between 10.1 % and 5 0 % , or below 2 0 % (table 22). It was found that in 580 of the 724 industrial firm s using foreign capital, foreign investors controlled the m ajority of the capital and that foreign participation was below 2 0 % only in 29 firms.
As regards their share in the value of total production, it was found that 8 0 % was generated by firms in which foreign capital controlled a m ajority of the capital, while only 7 .6 % of the total was accounted for by those having less than 2 0 % .
N o m atter w hich ind icator is considered -firm s, plants or p rod u ction -it is obvious that the transnational corporations preferred to operate where they could m aintain a position of hegemony, of real control, without mediation, over their investm ents in local industry, to the detrim ent of any forms of association with n ation al capital. T h is p h en om en on also occurred, without m ajor variations, in all strata of concentration and, independently of plant size, it was most evident in establishm ents employing more than 100 persons which operated in the most highly concentrated branches of industry where there were few enterprises.
c) Diversification and specialization o f production
A nother distinctive feature of transnational corporations in the manufacturing sector was the com position of enterprises at the local level. T his differentiation within the sphere of the transnational corporations was a factor of Table 22 A S o u r c e : P rep ared by the au th ors on th e basis o f K h av isse and Azpiazu (1 9 8 3 ). " H C B (F ): h ig h -co n cen trât ion branch es w ith few estab lish m en ts; H C B (M ): h ig h -co n cen tratio n branches w ith many e sta b lish m en ts; M C B: m ed iu m -con cen tration branch es; LCB: low -con cen tration branches. Table 23 A S o u r c e : Basualdo (1 9 8 5 ).
R G E N T IN A : D IST R IB U T IO N OF TR A N SN A T IO N A L C O R PO R A TIO N S A N D O F T H E IR SU BSID IA R IES, B Y D EV ELO PM EN T OF T H E IR IN D U ST R IA L A C T IV IT
decisive im portance during the tenue of Dr. M artínez de Hoz, when potential for grow th and entrepreneurial developm ent were linked to the exten t to which the transnational firms diversified their activities, both w ithin the manufacturing sector and in other economic activities. D uring the different stages of the im p o rt-su b stitu tio n p ro cess, the d ifferen t transnational corporations found their place w ithin the econom ic structure of Argentina a c c o rd in g to th e d y n am ics o f c a p ita l accumulation and reproduction. T h ese firms may be classified in two groups, according to the number of local firm s they controlled, either totally or partially. T h e first group would include those which controlled or had a share in the capital of a few subsidiaries operating in a small num ber of m arkets and which usually tried to rem it abroad a considerable portion of the profits earned in the country. T h e second group would be made up of transnational corporations which had m ajority or m inority control over the capital of a variety of local firm s, whose activities were integrated -vertically or horizontally-or d iv e rs ifie d , th ro u g h th e fo r m a tio n o f conglom erates. In the latter case, reinvestm ent of profits represented a substantial proportion of direct reproduction, allowing for the opening up of new subsidiaries in the country (Basualdo, 1984) .
T h e im portance of the role played by d iv e rs ifie d o r in te g ra te d tr a n s n a tio n a l corporations becomes clearly evident from an analysis of their distribution in term s of the number of local subsidiaries (table 23) . Table 23 shows that 55 transnational corporations (8 .7 % of the total) which had a majority or minority participation in the capital of seven or more subsidiaries together owned 697 firms, i.e., 3 9 .7 % of all subsidiaries established in the country. W hen transnational corporations which controlled an industrial firm are considered separately from those which only controlled non-m anufacturing local firm s, it becomes evident that only nine of the 55 firms which had seven or more subsidiaries did not control any industrial firm.
Industrial production was the central activity not only of the diversified or integrated transnational corporations, but also of those which had very few subsidiaries in the country, even though their relative im portance was quite different. T h e relative im portance of industrial subsidiaries fell sharply as the number of subsidiaries controlled by each transnational corporation increased (table 24 ). In the case of transnationals which owned from one to three lo ca l c o m p a n ie s, th e in d u stria l firm s represented 7 5 .5 % of their subsidiaries in the country, while in the case of those which owned 10 or more local firms, the industrial ones only represented 3 4 .1 % of the total.
T h e low p r o p o r t io n o f in d u s t r ia l subsidiaries and the high participation in overall production of the diversified or integrated transnational corporations can only be explained by differences in production scale, in which the larger relative size of those subsidiaries played an im p o rta n t part. T h e p red om in an tly industrial insertion of foreign capital, based on o lig o p o lis tic c o n tr o l of a n u m b er of manufacturing m arkets, was concentrated in a sm all num ber o f transnational corporations which accounted for 4 3 .5 % of the industrial production of foreign firms and controlled the re la tiv e ly la rg e r in d u stria l co m p a n ie s. Essentially, these were foreign capitals which had a share in the capital of m ajor local industrial corporations started during the first or second stages of the im port-substitution process.
T h e most im portant non-industrial activity for transnationals which controlled ten or more local firms was the financial and insurance sector, in which 2 3 .0 % o f the firm s in question operated. Transnational corporations which had a larger number of related companies controlled Table 24 A (1 9 8 5 ). " T h e industrial produ ction o f tran sn atio n al en terp rises (6 7 5 4 0 m illion 1973 dollars) includes th e produ ction g en erated by su bsidiaries w hose p are n t firm is unknow n. T h is rep resen ts 7 7 1 9 m illion 1973 dollars, a sum equ ivalent to 1 1 .4 % o f th e total. b A verage ind ustrial size is ob tain ed by dividing total production by the num ber o f firm s and o f su bsid iaries w ith industrial activity, respectively. a significant group of firm s organized under a s tr o n g p ro c e ss o f c o n g lo m e r a tio n and integration in which industrial production acted as the axis. Finance, insurance and other services w ere the m ost im p o rta n t n on -in d u strial activities as they provided an essential structural link between production and the circulation of the econom ic surplus.
The evolution o f transnational industrial corporations during the past decade a) Evolution o f the production o f transnational corporations and their relationship with sectoral development
T h e econom ic policy applied under the m ilitary régim e set up in 1976 brought about a profound change in the orientation of and the tren d s follow ed by the d ev elo p m en t of m anufacturing in the country, as well as in its role as the accumulation model of the economy. T h e results, i.e., the so-called "deindustrializa tio n 1' of the A rgentine economy, speak for th em selv es (K o sa c o ff, 1 9 8 4 ; Sou rrou ille, K osacoff and Lucángeli, 1985) . Thus, between 1975 and 1982 , the industrial G D P fell by 2 3 % , which means that the level recorded in 1982 was lower than that of the late 1960s; industrial em ploym ent fell by approxim ately 3 5 % , which means that approxim ately 400 000 wageearners lost their jobs; alm ost 2 0 % of industrial establishm ents closed down, real wages in industry declined by around 4 0 % , labour productivity rose substantially as a result of the elim ination of over-em ploym ent, "disciplining" of personnel and an increase in the number of intensity of hours worked, and investm ents in durable production equipm ents fell, on average, at a cumulative rate of 5 % per year, to a level lower than that of capital depreciation values.
T h e d isarticu latio n o f the in dustrial apparatus and the profound and prolonged sectoral recession led to a series of structural t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s w h ic h e n t a i l e d t h e disappearance of many sm all, medium-sized and large firm s, as well as a number of transfers and m ergers of com panies and, to a lesser extent, the addition of new factories.
T h e industrial transnational corporations were not unaffected by these structural changes.
On the contrary, they appear to have been the most active agents, particularly if one takes into account the qualitative im plications of those changes which they were instrum ental in bringing about. Table 25 shows that there was a slig h t decline in the sh are o f foreign corporations in manufacturing production. W hile in 1973, the transnational corporations accounted for 3 0 .8 % of the value of industrial production, in 1981 they accounted for 2 8 .6 % and in 1983 for 29.4% , One m ajor factor in the irregular evolution o f th e p a r t ic i p a t io n o f t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t io n s in in d u s t r ia l p r o d u c tio n , characterized by a slightly downward trend, was the closing down of som e large-scale foreign corporations (General M otors, C itroen, Otis Elevators, Insud, Metalúrgica Austral and O livetti), which more than offset the relatively higher participation of the rem aining firms. Depending on the nature of the industrial goods concerned (n on -d u rable con su m er goods, Table 25 A S o u r c e : K h av isse and A 2 piazu (1 9 8 3 ) and Basualdo (1 9 8 5 ).
durable goods, interm ediate goods and capital goo d s), this ev olu tion provides an oth er viewpoint and allows for a more accurate in terpretation of the results to be made. Table 26 shows that the overall trend was due to the sharp deterioration in the share of foreign capital in the production of interm ediate goods. W hile the participation of these firms in the production of non-durable consumer goods, durable goods and capital goods increased, their share in the production of interm ediate goods fell from 3 1 .5 % to 2 5 .8 % between 1973 and 1981 and recovered slightly in 1983 (2 7 .3 % ). T h is phenom enon is related to the structural changes which took place in som e m ajor branches, such as the steel industry, which u n d e r w e n t -e s p e c ia lly b e f o r e 1 9 8 1 -substantial changes as regards the profile of production and the presence of transnational corporations. In this regard, it is worth m entioning the decline in the number of factories (especially sheet m etal plants, but also some large establishm ents); the transfer of the participation of Belgium and French capitals in leading firms such as T am et and Santa Rosa; the integration of the production process by the national firm Acindar and its notable grow th in the steel market (absorbing firm s such as Gurmendi, Santa Rosa, Genaro G rasso). As a result of this, and despite the slight recovery recorded betw een 1981 and 1983, the participation of foreign capital in national production fell by alm ost 4 0 % with respect to 1973.
Th ere was a sim ilar decline in the production of non-ferrous metals, in which there Table 26 A S o u r c e : K h av isse and A zpiazu (1 9 8 3 ) and Basualdo (1 9 8 5 ). "E x clu d in g rhe tw o branches producing "m iscellan eou s goods". Table 27 A S o u r c e : K h av isse and A zpiazu (1 9 8 3 ) and Basualdo (1 9 8 5 ). "T h e co n cen tratio n strata considered are: H C B ; h ig h -co n cen tratio n branch es (eig h t estab lish m en ts generated m ore than 5 0 % o f production in th e b ra n ch ); M C B: m ed iu m -con cen tration branches (eig h t estab lish m en ts account for betw een 2 5 % and 5 0 % o f produ ction in the bran ch ); LCB: low -con cen tration branches (th e e ig h t b ig g estesta b lish m en ts co n tribu te less th an 2 5 % o f produ ction in th e bran ch ).
R G E N T IN A : SHARE OF TR A N SN A T IO N A L C O RPO RA TIO N S IN P RO D U C TIO N OF TH E D IF F E R E N T T Y P E S O F IN D U ST R IA L GOODS
was also a sale to national capital of firm s such as K IC SA and N ational Lead, the withdrawal of la rg e fo r e ig n c o r p o r a tio n s (In su d and M etalúrgica A ustral), and an increase in the im portance of national capital as a result of the production of primary aluminium by Aluar S.A.
As far as the other goods are concerned, there was an increase in the participation of foreign capital, which reached its peak in industries producing durable consumer goods (rising from 59-2% to 6 7 .2 % between 1973 and 1983) . T h is increase took place w ithin the overall context of a serious decline in the production of durable goods which was associated with the crisis of the automobile industry and the electrical hom e appliances industry. In both cases, the contraction of the local m arket and the strong com petition of im ports led to a sectoral readjustm ent which, contrary to the case with interm ediate goods, e n ta ile d an in c re a s e in tra n s n a tio n a l p articip atio n . T h e reo rg an izatio n of th e automobile industry (the withdrawal o f General M otors and Citroen, the purchase of Chrysler by Volkswagen, the m erger of Fiat and Peugeot and the closing down of the only non-transnational firm , Industrias Mecánicas del Estado), and the purchase of som e local firm s or of stocks in the area of electrical home appliances brought about an increase in the participation of foreign capital.
W hen the industrial sector is broken down according to market structure, as shown in ta b le 2 7 , it a p p e a rs th a t tra n s n a tio n a l p articip atio n in production g en erated in interm ediate forms of concentration was relatively stable, while there was a considerable increase in the more com petitive m arkets and a notable reduction in their contribution to production in the highly concentrated branches w h ich a re e s s e n tia l fo r its stru c tu ra l predom inance in local industry.
T h e grow ing transnational participation in the less concentrated branches of industry occurred in a few activities in which that greater share probably entailed changes in the degree of concentration of those branches with respect to the results of the m ost recent industrial census (for exam ple, the production of medicine).
T h e decline in foreign participation in the highly concentrated branches of industry is one of the m ost noteworthy aspects of the period under study. A com bination of two factors explains the loss of alm ost seven points in foreign participation (from 4 7 .9 % to 4 1 .0 % ); firstly, the side-effects of the reorganization of the steel industry and secondly, the development of the d ifferent oligopolistic branches, which depended on the magnitude of the transnational presence in them. In the first case, the structural reorganization of the steel industry led to a decline in the im portance of foreign capital, as a result of its deinvestm ent in the sector and its having taken a d ifferent course from that taken by the m ajor national-capital firms.
In the second place, the highly concentrated branches in which foreign capital represented a substantial share of production suffered, in most cases, a more far-reaching contraction than those equally oligopolistic branches in which the foreign presence was less significant.
If a sim plistic two-category classification is a p p lie d to th e stu d y -d iv id in g th e transnationals into those which controlled a small number of subsidiaries and operated in a limited number of m arkets, on the one hand, and, on the other, those which controlled a large number of local companies operating in a number of markets under an integrated or diversified system -it will be noted that the participation in industrial production of the latter type of corporation increased considerably by com parison with that of the transnationals w hich con trolled a sm aller num ber of subsidiaries in the country (table 28) .
T h e p redom in an ce o f diversified or integrated transnational corporations in the industrial production of foreign corporations as a whole increased generally, with slight variations, regardless of the type of goods considered. W ith the sole exception of those producing interm ediate goods, the corporations which controlled m ore subsidiaries increased their share while the share of those operating in a limited way fell, except in the case of the ones producing capital goods. This confirm s the view that one of the main changes which occurred during the last ten years as regards the perform ance o f foreign corporations in the m anufacturing se cto r was the grow ing leadership of the diversified or integrated corporations. T his phenom enon was a result of Table 28 A , 1973, 1981 A N D 1983 T h e p erfo rm an ce of the tran sn ation als was decisively influenced, in the first place, by the fact that the banking and fin an cial sector began to play a leading role in th eir makeup. Only 4 .9 % of the firm s con trolled by less diversified tran sn ation als were engaged in financial and insurance activ ities, w hile 2 3 % of the firm s controlled by highly integrated or diversified corp oration s operated in that area. As regards the substitution process, that structural d ifferen ce did not m ean there were d ifferen ces of substance, since m ost of the industrial firm s only needed to resort to selffin an cin g in order to o p erate norm ally in their m arkets. On the o th er hand, after the financial re fo rm o f 1 9 7 7 , w ith th e g e n e ra liz e d liberalization o f in terest rates and the role played by the fin an cial liquidity of the d ifferen t corp oration s and th eir case o f access to fin an cial circuits, that stru ctu ral d ifferen ce becam e fundam ental for d eterm in in g the g ro w th p o te n tia l o f c o rp o ra tio n s. T h e fin an cial con n ection s o f the diversified or in tegrated tran sn atio n als gave them several advantages -as well as high p ro fit ra tesduring years when the shortage of financial resources or their high relative cost meant bankruptcy or going out of business for many enterprises engaged in production.
A nother factor which explains the growing p red o m in an ce o f d iv ersified tra n sn atio n al corporations is the wide range of econom ic activities in which they engaged, which enabled them to constantly readjust their m anagem ent to fit the m acroeconom ic circum stances, since after 1976, a succession of non-industrial activities proved to be the m ost dynamic and p ro fita b le secto rs o f the econom y (th e agricultural sector, construction, services in general and finance in particular). In addition, there was a structural difference which had to do with the defensive capability provided by the degree of vertical integration of the firms.
In brief, the changes that took place within the structure of the transnational corporations had to do with the special nature of the deindustrialization process, and the hegemony o f the diversified or integrated transnational corporations increased to the extent that it pervaded the entire economy. T his trend contrasted not only with the evolution of the limited transnational corporations but also with that of industry as a whole and of the nationalcapital industrial enterprises in particular (table 29) .
T h e diversified or integrated transnational corporations com prise the only subgroup of firm s which did not suffer a decline in production between 1973 and 1983-b) The industrial elite and the transnational presence
In order to analyse the evolution of manufacturing enterprises after the breakdown of the democratic process (M arch 1976) and the subsequent application of a new econom ic policy, a group of 300 of the largest industrial firm s, in term s of annual invoiced sales, was selected. T h ese represent a little over half the industrial value added and reflect the changes which took place in the leadership of the sector.
A com parison o f the lists o f the 300 largest industrial firm s for 1976 and for 1983 shows sharp differences in the number of firm s making up the élite and in their share of total sales for the group. In order to get a m ore accurate idea of the actual nature of these changes, the 300 firms were divided into three subgroups according to their ranking in the list (first, second and third hundred); in addition, a distinction was made, at the top, betw een the first 25 and the first 50.
T h e results show that, over the seven years, foreign participation in sales of the industrial élite rose slightly (table 30) .
N evertheless, this picture of relatively stable perform ance, in which the growing im portance of the transnational corporations appears to have been no m ore than an adjustm ent to the historical trends recorded since the early 1960s, covers up certain m ajor m odifications in the com position of the rankings of the firms, which only because of the contrasting effects, from the point of view of the source of the firm s' capital, reflect that relative stability at the global level, albeit with a slight increase in the participation of the transnational corporations.
Thus, for example, the fact that the transnational corporations com prising the group of the 100 largest industrial firm s fell from 54 (1976) to 53 (1983) does not only imply that only one of those firm s left the élite as a result of having gone out of business or having dropped in rank. On the contrary, of the 53 firm s which occupied some o f the first 100 places in 1983, only 31 (5 8 .5 % ) had also held those places in 1976, while then ranked between 101 and 200 in 1983, another three were in the third hundred and two ranked below the 300. T h ree firm s were added as the result of mergers or takeovers during the period (Sevel, a m erger of Fiat and Peugeot; N obleza-Piccardo, the product of the takeover of Piccardo by N obleza; and MassaiinParticulares, the product of the takeover of Particulares and Im parciales by M assalin and Celasco); another three were new firms added to the industrial part (Volkswagen: R ío Colorado -an oil consortium including the Italian firm S A IP E N -and Equitel, belonging to Siem ens); and one was Isaura, an oil firm denationalized during the period.
T h is phenom enon occurred, to a greater or lesser degree, regardless of the position held by the firm s (table 31) .
T h e industrial élite underwent substantial ■changes which, although not fully reflected in Table 30 A iii
Conclusions
By the end of the past century, one of the salient features of the A rgentine economy was the strong presence of foreign capital. Because of its im portance to the vital activities of the agricultural exports model (transport, services pertaining to foreign trade, cold storage), it played a leading role in the developm ent of the economy and had a high accumulation potential.
As the agricultural exports model gradually declined and the first signs of the new accumulation pattern -based on im port substitution-appeared, foreign investm ent took on new form s, i.e., the export-related sectors tended to be displaced by activities that were primarily related to manufacturing and aimed at m eeting domestic demand.
B o th during the first stage o f the substitution process, when the em phasis was on light industry, and during the second stage, when the substitution of interm ediate goods and durable consum er goods began, foreign capital took over the areas having the greatest potential for grow th. As in the case of the agroexports model, the foreign presence tended to become polarized towards the more dynamic nuclei of capital accumulation.
B e tw e e n th e m id -1 9 6 0 s , w h en th e investm ents brought in during the late 1950s had m atured, and th e m id -1 9 7 0 s, the transnational corporations took full advantage o f the opportunities provided by a domestic m arket that was heavily protected from international com petition, without there being any need of a new influx of large direct investm ents.
F ro m 1 9 7 6 o n w a rd s, h o w ev er, th e c o n d itio n s u nd er w h ich th e A rg e n tin e econom y developed changed radically. In that c o n te x t, d esp ite the stron g in cen tives offered -essen tially, the g en eral openin g up of m arkets, w ith the con com itan t guarantees that e n ta ile d -new direct investm ents were not significant. T h e relatively sm all amount of foreign capital that was brought in was mainly directed toward the exploitation of natural resources, especially oil and gas, and toward banking and financial activities pertaining to the provision of specific services to a limited clientele and to the new opportunities arising from the opening up of the capital market.
T h e trends followed by United States in v estm en ts in the country tended to corroborate those sectoral trends. Also, it is evident that the transnational corporations established in the country, especially those operating in the aforem entioned sectors, made large profits. N evertheless, despite these high p rofits, the corporations did not follow an active policy to reinvestm ent. Quite to the contrary, it appears that, at the global level, priority was given to rapidly recovering the capital invested -through rem ittances of profits and even repatriation of capital-rather than to reinvesting in the country beyond the levels of profit that such reinvestm ent might generate.
This perform ance which, in principle, may seem to depart from what is considered typical, was due to the profoundly recessive conditions which prevailed from the m id-1970s onward, in the country's economy, especially in its manufacturing sector. T o this was added a clim ate of uncertainty as to how long the policy of openness would be followed. In that regard, it seemed logical to assume that m ost of the transnational corporations would give priority to rem itting their profits to their parent c o m p a n ie s and w ould m in im iz e new investm ents in the country. T h is was especially true in the industrial sector, where to the scanty flow of new external capital was added the withdrawal from the market and subsequent repatriation of capital of large transnational corporations, as well as a high level of rem ittances of profits to parent companies. This can be explained by the exhaustion of market opportunities, without which the legal and in s titu tio n a l in c e n tiv e s o ffe re d to th e transnational corporations were not enough to induce the foreign firms to make investm ent and reinvestm ent decisions that were closely linked to the market (Sourrouille, G atto and Kosacoff, 1984) .
In any event, within the far-reaching process of deindustrialization that took place, the transnational corporations did not follow any set pattern. Even though their overall share of total industrial production fell slightly, a significant group of those firms -those having a greater degree of diversification or integration of production-tended to account for an increasing proportion of total production and even more so of the production generated by the transnational corporations.
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